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This paper describes the traffic forecasting 
procedure used in the Winnipeg Area Trans-
portation Study. It then reviews the 
assumptions on which the forecasts were based, 
compares these with procedures used elsewhere, 
and concludes that the forecasts dramatically 
overstate the need for freeways. Following 
this, an economic analysis suggests that the 
freeways are poor value for money, even when 
the inflated forecasts are used. Some suggestions 
. for improving the analysis, and testing alternative 
transport schemes are included. 
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INTRODUCTION 
.The W.A.T.S. report recommends a dramatic change in Winnipeg's 
current policies, involving a massive increase in transportation investment 
for major roads, freeways, and rapid transit, with important implications 
for taxes, other services, and the environment. 
The recommendation was based on forecasts prepared by a firm of 
private consultants for the Streets and Transit nivision. 
Many important assumptions upon which the forecal!lts were based, and 
the criteria by which the final recommendation was made, were, however, 
never explicitly stated, They remain buried in the technical mystery of the 
consultant's computer model. 
This paper begins with a brief description of the forecasting 
procedure. It then describes in some detail how various assumptions have 
been incorporated into the computer model. 
An understanding of the forecasting assumptions will help to explain 
why a road system, more extensive than has ever been undertaken in any 
other Canadian city before, is now being recommended for Hinnipeg. 
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2. 
THE FORECASTINr. MODEL 
The forecasting model is described schematically in Figure 1. The 
boxes represent information categories. The arrows indicate the sequence 
of operations. 
The study area is first divided into a number of geographical traffic 
zones (W.A.T.S. used 126). The process then begins from two independent 
sets of information, £lanning inputs, and network in£uts. 
Planning inputs by zone such as population, and employment, provide 
the basis for estimating the nwnbers of trips startinp, and ending in.each 
zone (trip ends). 
Network inputs Auch as road lengths and t-Tidths, parking charges, 
transit frequency, etc. provide the basis for estimating free flow inter-zonal 
costs and times by mode. 
These two separate streams of informati.on, then come together as 
shown by the arrows, to predict the pattern of inter-zonal tri£ interchanges. 
Total inter-zonal trips are then allocated to public and private transport 
modes in the modal split operation. This operation is based on the relative 
inter-zonal travel times and costs of ~he two modes •. Private trips are con-
verted to vehicle trips by the application of an average car occupancy factor, 
3. 
and then assiRned to the road network via the cheapest inter-~onal route. 
The network loadings so determined frequently exceed the free flow 
capacities on which the original inter-zonal costs were based. A feedback 
speed reduction technique, as shown by the dotted line, is therefore used 
·to determine a new set of loaded inter-zonal costs. Trips are then re-assigned 
to the network, on new routes, according to the adjusted costs. This last 
step recycles until consistancy of speeds and loadinp,s is established. 
THF. STUDY PROCEf!S 
The model described above forms the background for the entire study 
process. The survey phase provides base vear (lq62) observations for all 
of the input and output boxes. This information is then used in the travel 
analysis phase to determine the mathematical operations indicated by the 
connecting arrows. The model is calibrated when it is able to approximately 
reproduce the observed travel outputs usinp, only the initial planning and 
network inputs. 
At the forecasting phase new planning inputs for the desip,n year 1991, 
and n.etwork inputs for a test scheme are prepared (W. A. T. fl. scheme 1) • The 
model is then used to predict trip ends, trip interchanges, modal split, 
network loadings, and inter-zonal travel costs, using the mathematical relation-
ships developed previously. 
-------------------------------------------------~------~ 
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This process is repeated for alternative test schemes (W.A.T.S. 2,.3,4, & 5). 
The schemes are then compared in the evaluation phase in terms of their 
relative traffic performances and investment costs. 
THE ASSUMPTIONS 
No computer model can reproduce the many dimensions of human and traffic 
behaviour exactly. Limitations imposed by computer capacity, theoretical 
knowled~e, and data. availability, re~uire the use of many unproved assumptions, 
compromises, and value judgements, If these limitations are explicitly 
reco~nized, and the output correctly interpreted, the model can be tremendously 
valuable in the design of an enlightened transportation program. This inter-
pretive aspect seems, however, to have been largely absent in the W.A.T.S. 
study. 
This point is demonstrated in the following review of some important 
W.A.T.S. assumptions. The points are considered in order of themodelling 
sequence described earlier. The W.A.T.S. approach is contrasted with methods 
used elsewhere, and also with an abstract approximation of the ideal •. 
Traffic zone designation requires at the outset a compromise between 
a large number of small zones for greater accuracy, and a smaller number of 
large zones for computer efficiency. F.ach zone is connected to the traffic 
network from a single central point. This may have important implications for 
the downtown area. For instance, the entire area between Portage and Broadway 
from Edmonton to the Red River is one single zone. Modelling of traffic within 
this area is therefore considerably limited. 
The traffic model estimates that with the freeways, the inter-~onnl 
road system, will handle more than double the 1962 rate of car traffic into 
the downtown without appreciable congestion. As the internal zone modelling 
is less than precise, this fails to foresee the monumental traffic .1ams that 
will be encouraged on already loaded downtown streets. 
Planning inputs are treated in a less than ideal fashion largely due 
to limitations in the current state of theory. Estimates of population and 
employment by zone, aresupp11.ed to the transport modellers by the city planning 
department. This single set of planning inputs is held constant for all 
transport schemes tested. Note that in figure 1, there is no feedback from 
the transport network on the planning inputs. The same applies in the London 
model shown in Figure 2. A more realistic "ideal" procedure is illustrated 
in Figure 3. As no existing model is yet capable of handling the ideal 
adequately, the analyst must instead interpret his results from an awareness 
of these limitations. 
For instance, freeways are now believed to have R ma.1or decentralizing 
impact on cities, accelerating the drift of population from the downtown to the 
suburbs.. This has important implications for the downtown development plan, and 
it is likely that the two plans are contradictory. 
The impact of freeways on development is already apparent from the 
large number of industries that havepurchased land speculatively along the 
proposed beltway route. 
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The effect of such decentralization is to further increase the rlemand 
I !for road travel, and as in Los Angeles, to create a low density sprawl, that 
llsounds the death knell of public transport, The W.A.T.S. study takes no 
account of these factors, and assumes instead unrealistically that it will I . 
!continue to be possible to support a vi.ahle puhlic transport system for the 
!lar~e portion of the population that must depend on it. 
Network inputs are one of the few things that can he determined independently 
;of feedback, althou~h for the reason mentioned above, the W ,,A. T ,S. proposal 
'likely underestimates the extent of subsidy that would he required to maintain 
ithe specified level of public transport service if the freeways are built, 
Althou~h factors such as comfort, reliability, trip continuity, and 
!information are important in transport choice, accordin~ to the W.A.T.S. report, 
!network description is limited to factors that can be meaningfully expressed 
I 
lin quantitative terms. Limitations such as these are common to most models, but 
llagain they should not be forgotten when the output is ultimately translated 
into policy .. 
I 
In the forecastin~ stage, factors such as future parking char~es, transit 
!fares, and operating costs are independently estimated. Rising land prices and 
~ence parking charges, plus increasin~ fuel energy costs are likely to discourage 
I 
!car travel more than public transport. A p,reat international effort on the 
I 
[development of public transport technologies may further this trend, altho.ugh 
I 
I 
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offset to some measure by rising wages. These forma of price trend may not 
have been adequately considered. 
Trip ends considered in the model relate only to 7:30 to 8:30 a.m. 
trips from home to work. Other trips are introduced only at the end of the 
model through the use of expansion factors. Hhile the rush hours undoubtedly 
account for the heaviest load i.n the day, it should be kept in mind that work 
trips themselves are more centrally oriented than other trips, and normally 
account for only 25 per cent of total daily trips. This raises the question 
whether the network design is best for the majority of uses. 
One important deficiency in the study is the lack of any consideration 
of external trips. One quick glance at the beltway plan, and the problem is 
obvious. The trip from the Trans Canada lli~hway at Portage Avenue Heat to the 
Trans Canada East on the Perimeter Highway is shorter by 4 miles via the beltway 
route. This would likely draw all 'the trucks and other throu~h traffic from 
the Perimeter High~ay 1 sendin~ them thundering through Fort Garry and St. Vital. 
This problem would be less likely to occur if orbital suburban routes were 
built to grade signalled standard. 
The most important deficiency is, however, a lack of any feedback or 
network response on the peak hour trip end production. This is indicated by the 
flow of arrows in Figure 1, and comparisons are drawn with the London and "Ideal" 
models in Figures 2 and 3. 
8. 
Much of the need for radial freeways into the downtown was based on an 
expected increase in downtown destined peak hour traffic from 24,085 trips 
in 1962 to 42,800 in 1991. This increase was derived from assumptions about 
the planning inputs, An expected 22 per cent increase in employment accounts 
for 5300 of the extra trips. The remaining 13,415 trips were based on the 
assumption that with future employment more office oriented, more workers 
would travel to work in the height of the rush hour than do now. 
Much of the freeway justification is therefore based not on p,rowth 
~enerated by city size, but rather on the assumption that the rush hour will 
become more concentrated, and that we must cater to it, Observat1.ons through 
time in other cities suggest that the peak hour normally becomes less con-
centrated as the p,eneral level of traffic grows. 
In 1962, 57% of car trips entering downtown Hinnipeg in the peak hour 
had destinations there. The W.A.T.S, assumed for the above reaRon that this 
would increase to 70% by 1991, Recent surveys for 1971 indicate the fi~ure has 
fallen instead to 51%. Conclusions are difficult to draw from this without 
benefit of the absolute changes in total traffic. Nonetheless, the indication 
is that the original justification for the radial freeways is in serious doubt, 
Finally, the W.A.T.S. report gives no indication of the effects a more 
concentrated peak would have on public transport operations and finance. 
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Inter-zonal trip int_e_rchEtnBes are Etlso forecast on the nssumption of no 
network response feedback. These trips are estimated initially on the 
assumption that the number of trips between any two zones is directly proportional 
to the total number of trips starting in the generating zone, and the total 
number ending in the attraction zone, and is inversely proportional to the 
cost .of travel between two zones. 
The inter-zonal costs were, however, based on free flow costs with no 
feedback from the loaded network costs. It means in effect, that people make 
choices re~ardinp, the relative locations of their homes and work places, taking 
into consideration free flow travel costs, even though they may never tr~el 
under these ideal conditions. 
'the effect is to over-estimate average trip lengths for congested networks 
like scheme 1, and to under-estimate them for freeway networks like scheme 5. 
The modal split operation also suffers from lack of feedback and response 
to road conp,estion. This was probably not too important in 196?. when little 
congestion existed. It also is probably of little consequence when the public 
transport network conAists of buses running on the regular street system. In 
this case, buses and cars are equally affected by congestion, and the relative 
difference between them remains similar. It would, however, have a major effect 
on the use of rapid transit facilities, which are not affected by road congestion. 
Inclusion of feedback is of obvious importance in the London model. 
LIBRAHY 
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For Winnipeg, unless this feature is incorporated, the planners will 
not bother to test rapid rail transit or reserved lane busway schemes, con-
vinced as they are on such bad evidenc~ that freeways are the only solution. 
Finally on the subje_ct of modal split, the survey analysis indicated 
a hig~ level of importance to walkin~, waiting, and transfer time as a deterrent 
to public transport use. In this regard, a comprehensive reserved lane 
busway system on most arterial routes would seem more worthwhile than a few 
express freeway buses, and a limited park and ride dependent subway scheme. 
The network loading procedure seems quite reasonable, although it requires 
the use of an independently determined car occupancy factor to convert person 
trips by car to vehicle trips. In this case they appear to have chosen a ratio 
of one person per car for 1991. Perhaps this is reasonable for Los Angeles 
but some network response such as pooling would no doubt take place if parking 
charges were to increase. 
EVALUATION 
Most of the criticisms above relate to the failure of the system to make 
sufficient response to changes in road travel costs• Normal economic behaviour 
suggests people will attempt less travel in congested situations by making fewer 
trips, shorter trips, trips at different times, trips by other modes, and a 
variety of adjustments. This being the case, the model overstates the amount 
of travel and therefore the degree of congestion for the minimum investment 
scheme 1. For similar reasons, it may underestimate the degree to which the 
------------------------------------------·--·------~~~------ --. 
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the W.A.T.S. scheme 5 will generate extra traffic, thereby exa~geratin~ the 
traffic relievinp, effect of the freeway. 
Under these circumstances, benefit measures based on these estimates 
must be considered overstatement!'~ of true value. The H.A.T.S. report does not, 
of course, attempt any form of economic evaluation at all. Although the cdteria 
for choosing W.A.T.S. scheme 5 is never explicitly stated, it iR implied, 
that whatever amount of money is necessary to almos"t totally eliminate congestion, 
is justified. 
This simplistic approach misses entirely the whole purpose or nature 
of an urban economy. It fails to realize that while it may take longer to 
travel a mile in urban areas than it does on the family farm, it is necessary to 
travel far fewer miles to reach the same range of services. Attempting to 
eliminate congestion through increased road investment is therefore not only 
futile, but may also be economically undesireable. 
To illustrate this point using more conventional investment criteria, a 
few calculations are shown below. The data is derived from page 169, Volume 3 of 
the W.A.T.S. report. Investment costs are increased by a conservative 25 per 
cent to allow for inflation between 1967 and 1973. 
The addition of the suburban beltway in scheme 2, to the major road system 
of scheme 1, would save 124,400 travellers 2.86 minutes on average every work 
12. 
day rush hour. At'll'tumin~ 500 rush hours A year, the annual time ARVin~ would he 
124,400 X 2.86 X 500 
60 
... 
3 million person hours • At a total cost of $160 
million, the annual interest charges for the beltway would be $16 million. 
The cost for every person hour saved would therefore he 16 + 3 = $5.30. 
Adding the radial freeways and rapid transit line of scheme 5, to the 
scheme 2 system, would save 124,400 travellers a further 4.79 minutes on 
average each rush hour. In this. case the extra annual time saving would be 
124,400 x 4.79 x 500. 5 million person hours. The extra cost would be 
60 
$440 million in total, or $44 million in annual interest costs. The cost of 
these components would therefore come to 44 + 5 a $8.80 for every,person hour 
saved. 
Although it is not strictly accurate to attribute benefits to different 
components of a single scheme without doing additional model tests, an approxi-
mation is shown below for the radial freeway and transit components of scheme 
5, taken separately. 
The radial freeways alone save 88,400 car travellers 4.08.minutes on 
average each rush hour. The annual time savings is therefore: 
88,400 X 4.08 X 500 a 
60 
2.95 million hours. 
At a total cost of $345 million, the annual interest charges would be $34.5 million. 
The cost for every person hour saved is therefore 34.5 + 2.95 a $11.70. 
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The rapid transit line alone saves 36,000 transit riders 6.77 minutes 
on average each rush hour. The annual time saving is therefore: 
36 2000 x 6.77 x 500. 2.05 million hours. 
no 
At a total cost of $95 million, the annual interest char~es would be $9.5 million. 
The cost for every person hour saved is therefore 9.5 + 2.05 • $4.60. 
There are of course other factors not considered above, such as private 
operating cost savings, off-peak time savings, transit operatin~ costs, and 
road maintenance costs. Private operating cost savings would be less than a 
million dollars a year for the beltway or the radial freeways. Time savings 
in the uncongested off-peak hours might also be quite low. 
On balance, considering the overestimation of peak-time savings discussed 
earlier, these calculations should therefore provide a reasonable indication 
of worth. How much then should we be willinp, to pay to save time? Studies on 
toll road and commuter situations in Rritain indicate that people will, given the 
choice, pay about one-quarter of their wage rate to save an hour's travel time. 
On this basis, $1.50 per hour would seem a more than generous amount to spend 
in Winnipeg. 
None of the freeway, or transit schemes discussed above come even close 
to this figure. The transit scheme is the best at $4.60 an hour, although as 
mentioned above, further tests would he needed to determine whether this is an 
over or under estimate. 
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This figure begins to look more interesting, however, in light of 
recent newspaper reports suggestinp, that a monorail with similAr performance 
characteristics might be built at one-fifth the coAt of the l\'.A.T,S. scheme. 
This would bring the time saving cost down to 90 cents an hour. 
Reserved lane busways operating on existinp, streets could be even 
cheaper, more flexible, and visually preferable, although perhaps somewhat 
slower. 
Besides the objective traffic benefit criteria mentioned above, consider-
ation should also be given to the distribut:l.on of the benefits. More than a 
third of any urban population, old people, children, the handicapped, and the 
poor will always be dependent on public transport. The benefits to these groups 
should be compared favourably with those to the car driving public. In 
addition, environmental and social costs to the victims of progress should 
receive fair consideration,.and generous compensation should be made when dis-
ruption is deemed necessary for the general good. 
Comparison of scheme components in terms of objective criteria, such as 
thosementioned above, can be very useful in developing a transit plan. Used 
in this manner, and with some of the modifications suggested earlier, the 
computer model could become a valuable planning tool. 
As in many other cities, however, the W.A.T.S. model has not been used 
to develop the best and most economic transport package possible. It has been 
15. 
used instead to justify a number of preconceived notions. As early a~ 1964, 
before the model had even been tested on the 1962 data, Metro Transport 
planners announced the need for a plan similar to thnt proposed today. Tt is 
now time for a rethink. 
